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Abstract
In this paper, we correct a ﬂaw in Proposition 1 of Yoshihara
(2010). The original proof of Proposition 1 is correct only with the
existence of reproducible solutions with zero proﬁt rate. In contrast,
this note provides an alternative characterization of the domain of
economies under which the existence of reproducible solutions with
possibly non-zero maximal proﬁt rates is shown.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D31, D46, D63.
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1 Introduction
This note corrects a ﬂaw in the proof of Proposition 1 in Yoshihara (2010). In
Yoshihara (2010), Proposition 1 argued the necessary and suﬃcient condition
for the domain of aggregate endowments of material productive assets to
have a non-trivial RS under such an economy: given a closed convex-cone
∗Phone: (81)-42-580-8354, Fax: (81)-42-580-8333. e-mail: yosihara@ier.hit-u.ac.jp
1production possibility set P with generic element (−α0,−α,α), the following






+ | ∃α ∈ P : α 5 ω, α ≮ ω, α − α0b = α & α − ω − α0b ∈ ∂ e P
o
,
where e P ≡ {α − α − α0b ∈ R
m | (−α0,−α,α) ∈ P},
u n d e rw h i c ha nR S(p,1) exists. However, if the domain C∗ is given by this
deﬁnition, it is true that there exists an RS under any ω ∈ C∗,b u ts u c h
an RS is associated only with zero proﬁt rate. However, since in Yoshihara
(2010) the main theorems presumed that the economy is under an RS with
a positive maximal proﬁt rate, the existence theorem of RSs with zero proﬁt
rate per se is not suﬃcient to show the consistency of the economic frame-
work to develop the main analyses. Thus, it is necessary to provide the
domain condition of aggregate endowments of capital goods to guarantee the
existence of RSs with possibly positive maximal proﬁt rates. In this note, we
provide a reformulation of the domain C∗ under which an RS with possibly
positive maximal proﬁt rate exists.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
Following Yoshihara (2010), let P be the production set. P h a se l e m e n t so f
the form α =( −α0,−α,α) where α0 ∈ R+ , α ∈ Rm
+ ,a n dα ∈ Rm
+ .T h u s ,
elements of P are vectors in R2m+1.T h eﬁrst component, −α0,i st h ed i r e c t
labor input of process α;a n dt h en e x tm components, −α, are the inputs of
goods used in the process; and the last m components, α, are the outputs
of the m goods from the process. The net output vector arising from α is
denoted as b α ≡ α − α. P is assumed to be a closed convex cone containing
the origin in R2m+1. Moreover, it is assumed that:
A1 .∀α ∈ P s.t. α0 ≥ 0 and α = 0, [α ≥ 0 ⇒ α0 > 0];1 and
A2 .∀ commodity m vector c ∈ Rm
+ , ∃α ∈ P s.t. b α = c.
A3 .∀α ∈ P, ∀(−α0,α0) ∈ Rm
− ×Rm
+ , [(−α0,α0) 5 (−α,α) ⇒ (−α0,−α0,α0) ∈ P].
A1 implies that labor is indispensable to produce any non-negative output
vector; A2 states that any non-negative commodity vector is producible as a
1For all vectors x =( x1,...,x p) and y =( y1,...,y p) ∈ Rp, x = y if and only if xi = yi
(i =1 ,...,p); x ≥ y if and only if x = y and x 6= y; x>yif and only if xi >y i
(i =1 ,...,p).
2net output; and A3 is a free disposal condition, which states that, given any
feasible production process α, any vector producing (weakly) less net output
than α is also feasible using the same amount of labour as α itself.
As a notation, we use, for any set S ⊆ Rm, ∂S ≡ {x ∈ S | @x0 ∈ S s.t. x0 >x }.
Given a market economy, any price system is denoted by p ∈ Rm
+ ,w h i c hi sa
price vector of m commodities. Moreover, a subsistence vector of commodi-
ties b ∈ Rm
+ is also necessary in order to supply one unit of labor per day. We
assume that the nominal wage rate is normalized to unity when it purchases
the subsistence consumption vector only, so that pb =1holds.
Again, following Yoshihara (2010), denote the set of agents by N with
generic element ν. All agents have access to the same technology P,b u tt h e y
possess diﬀerent endowments ων ∈ Rm
+ , whose distribution in the economy
is given by (ων)ν∈N ∈ RNm
+ .A n a g e n t ν ∈ N with ων c a ne n g a g ei nt h e
following three types of economic activities: she can sell her labor power γν
0;







or she can work for herself to operate αν =( −αν
0,−αν,αν) ∈ P.G i v e n a
price vector p ∈ Rm
+ and a nominal wage rate w, it is assumed that each
agent chooses her activities, αν, βν,a n dγν
0, in order to maximize the revenue
subject to the constraints of her capital and labor endowments.

































Given (p,w),l e tAν (p,w) be the set of actions (αν; βν; γν
0) ∈ P ×P ×[0,1]
which solve MPν at prices (p,w),a n dl e t
Π





















As in Yoshihara (2010), the equilibrium notion for this model is given as
follows:






,w h e r ep ∈ Rm
+ , w = pb =1 ,a n d
(αν; βν; γν
0) ∈ P × P × [0,1], such that:
3(a) ∀ν ∈ N, (αν; βν; γν
0) ∈ Aν (p,w) (revenue maximization);
(b) α + β 5 ω (social feasibility),
where α ≡
P
ν∈N αν, β ≡
P
ν∈N β
ν,a n dω ≡
P
ν∈N ων;








(d) b α + b β = α0b + β0b (reproducibility),
where b α ≡
P



















which is the aggregate production activity actually accessed in this RS. Thus,
the pair ((p,w),αp,w) is the summary information of this RS. In the following,







3 Reformulation of Proposition 1
Let α0 (ω) ≡ max{α0 | ∃α =( −α0,−α,α) ∈ P s.t. α 5 ω}.G i v e nt h ep r o -
duction set P and a non-negative number π = 0,l e t
e P (π) ≡ {α − (1 + π)α − α0b ∈ R







+ | ∃α ∈ P & ∃π = 0:α 5 ω, α ≮ ω, b α = α0b & α − (1 + π)ω − α0b ∈ ∂ e P (π)
o
Lemma: Under A1vA3, C∗∗ i san o n - e m p t ya n dc l o s e dc o n v e xc o n e .
Proof. It is clear that C∗∗ is a closed convex cone. To see the non-
emptyness, let P (α0 =1 ;b) ≡ {α ∈ P | α0 =1& b α = b}.I fP (α0 =1 ;b)=












Then, by P (α0 =1 ;b) 6= ∅, π∗ = 0.M o r e o v e r , α∗ − (1 + π∗)α∗ − α∗
0b ∈
∂ e P (π∗) holds. To see the last property, suppose not. Then, there exists
another α0−(1 + π∗)α0−α0
0b ∈ e P (π∗) such that α0−(1 + π∗)α0−α0
0b>α∗−
(1 + π∗)α∗−α∗
0b. The last inequality implies that mini=1,...,m {α0
i − (1 + π∗)α0
i − α0
0bi} >
40 by mini=1,...,m {α∗
i − (1 + π∗)α∗
i − α∗
0bi} =0 , which is a contradiction from
the deﬁnition of π∗.T h u s ,α∗ − (1 + π∗)α∗ − α∗
0b ∈ ∂ e P (π∗) holds, so that
ω ≡ α∗ ∈ C∗∗.
Then:
Proposition 1: Let b ∈ Rm
++ and α0 (ω) 5 |N|.U n d e rA 1 vA3, there ex-





, for the economy
above if and only if ω ∈ C∗∗.





be an RS. Given the proﬁle
(αν; βν; γν
0)ν∈N,l e tαp,1 be the corresponding social production point. At
this RS, pαp,1 = pω.T h u s , αp,1 5 ω by Deﬁnition 1(b), but αp,1 ≮ ω.
From Deﬁnition 1(d), αp,1 − α
p,1
0 b = αp,1.A l s o ,f r o mD e ﬁnition 1(a), αp,1 ∈
P




pω is the maximal proﬁtr a t ea t(p,1).
Thus, for any other α0 ∈ P, pαp,1−(1 + π)pω−α
p,1
0 =0= pα0−(1 + π)pα0−
α0
0 holds. This implies that αp,1 − (1 + π)ω − α
p,1
0 b ∈ ∂ e P (π) and p ∈ S ≡ ©
p ∈ Rm
+ | pb =1
ª






by αp,1 ∈ P, αp,1 5 ω,a n dA 3 .
(⇐):L e tω ∈ C∗∗. Then, there exists α∗ =( −α∗
0,−α∗,α∗) ∈ P and π = 0
such that α∗ 5 ω with α∗ ≮ ω, α∗ − α∗
0b = α∗,a n dα∗ − (1 + π)ω − α∗
0b ∈
∂ e P (π).S i n c eα∗ − (1 + π)ω − α∗
0b ∈ ∂ e P (π), by the supporting hyperplane
theorem and A3, there exists p∗ ∈ Rm
+\{0} which supports α∗ −(1 + π)ω −
α∗
0b in e P (π).M o r e o v e r , s i n c e b ∈ Rm
++ , p∗ can be normalized to p∗ ∈ S.
Thus, for any α − (1 + π)α − α0b ∈ e P (π), p∗α∗ − (1 + π)p∗ω − α∗
0 = p∗α −
(1 + π)p∗α − α0 holds. By the cone property of e P (π), p∗α∗ − (1 + π)p∗ω −
α∗
0 =0 .M o r e o v e r , p∗α∗ − (1 + π)p∗α∗ − α∗
0 =0by α∗ 5 ω with α∗ ≮ ω.
This implies that α∗ realizes the maximal proﬁtr a t ea t(p∗,1),a n dπ is the
associated maximal proﬁtr a t e .
Let (ων)ν∈N be a distribution of initial endowments such that
P
ν∈N ων =
ω. Then, by the cone property of P, α∗ν + β∗ν ≡
p∗ων
p∗ω α∗ and γ∗ν =1
constitute an individually optimal solution for each ν ∈ N.A l s o , b y t h e
property of ω and α∗,D e ﬁnition 1(b) and 1(d) hold. Finally, since α0 (ω) 5







Note that the set C∗ introduced in Yoshihara (2010) is a subset of C∗∗,
and it can be shown as a corollary of the above Proposition 1 that there
5exists an RS (p,1) associated with the maximal proﬁtr a t eπ =0if and only
if ω ∈ C∗.
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